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This thesis proposes a numerical measure of the combat
power potential of U.S. Marine Corps close air support (CAS)
aircraft. The combat power potential of a weapon system is
defined as the rate at which the system could deliver lethal
fire to any point on the battlefield, accounting for
particular and relevant battlefield and enemy
characteristics. This measure is expressed in units of
"kills per minute," where each point is hypothesized to have
an infinite supply of instantaneously replaced targets.
The collection of these values (i.e., kills per minute
for each battlefield point) is suitable for display as a
"combat potential surface," overlaid on a battlefield map.
In this thesis, points of higher potential are keyed to
brighter colors (e.g., red, yellow, orange). The end result
is a battlefield visualization tool to assist commanders and




The reader is cautioned that computer programs
developed in this research may not have been exercised for
all cases of interest. While every effort has been made,
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are
free of computational and logic errors, they cannot be
considered validated. Any application of these programs
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a aircraft type, a = F/A-18D or AV-8B
Ap
t
target acquisition degradation factor for FAC
F\ r i = 1 , 2 , 3 .
Alert aircraft alert status, Alert = GA (ground
alert) or AA (air alert)
Bi aircraft base i, i = 1,2,3 . . . , where B t
is a x,y pair of Cartesian coordinates
dB^xy horizontal distance from base Bj to point
x,y, i = 1,2,3 . . .
df^xy straight line (not necessarily horizontal)
distance from FAC F, to point x,y
dop-^xy horizontal distance from the aircraft's orbit
point to point x,y
Fj Forward Air Controller, i = 1,2,3 . . . , may
be ground-based or airborne
fta fraction of enemy force of target type ta,
<fta < 1, |/r = l
k flight type, k = del (ordnance delivery
flight) or max (maximum endurance flight)
kiaSajc knots indicated air speed for aircraft a for
flight type k
K(%a kills per sortie against target type ta given
ordnance type o
L* minimum loiter time required over target for
a sortie to be launched
n number sorties allocated a CAS mission per 24
hour period
o ordnance type, e.g., o = Mk-82, Mk-83, etc.
o\ ta ordnance type o given target type ta
xiii
P pilot proficiency degradation factor,
< P < 1
PPcas combat power potential of close air support
PPdf combat power potential of direct fire weapons
PPif combat power potential of indirect fire
weapons
R sorties per minute, -ft =
"i44o
Rangea maximum flight endurance time for aircraft a,
expressed in minutes of flight, e.g.,
RangeFiA-\u>- 103 minutes
SFijy binary variable (0,1) to indicate
line-of-sight between forward air controller
Ft and point x,y
SSPd single sortie probability of damage
SSPDo|ta,te averaged single sortie probability of damage
against target ta, given ordnance o, and in
general terrain type te
t time (in minutes) measured from a reference
time, t = 0, which marks the start of a 24
hour planning period
t time (in minutes) an air or ground alert
aircraft receives a mission, measured from
t =
tDEP clock time of aircraft departure for
designated orbit point measured from t =
ta target type, e.g., ta = tanks, infantry, etc.
T threat degradation factor, < T < 1
tk time (in minutes) required for ground alert
aircraft to get airborne after receiving a
mission
V visibility degradation factor, <. V < 1
xiv
x,y Cartesian coordinates for points in a
battlefield area
ZajUertjcyj binary variable to indicate whether point x,y
is within striking range of aircraft a, in




The ability to concentrate forces at critical times and
places on the battlefield, while maintaining the minimal
forces elsewhere to deter defeat, is an essential quality of
a successful commander. A battlefield visualization tool
that can show a commander the impact of his decisions on his
capability to mass his forces will surely aid him in
perfecting that quality.
Previous work aimed at developing such a battlefield
visualization tool has focussed on graphically depicting the
"combat potential" of direct fire (e.g., machine gun,
anti-tank missiles, etc.) and indirect fire (e.g.,
aritllery, mortars, etc.) weapon systems. This thesis
extends this work by quantifying the "combat power
potential" of the third principal combat arm available to a
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander, close air support
(CAS) .
This "combat potential," or "combat power potential" as
it is called in this thesis, is defined as the rate at which
weapons systems could deliver lethal fire to any point on
the battlefield, at any time, after accounting for
particular and relevant battlefield and enemy
characteristics. This measure is expressed in units of
"kills per minute" for each battlefield point at each time
xvn
t, where each point is hypothesized to have an infinite
supply of instantaneously replaced targets.
Determining the combat power potential of CAS is a two
step calculation: first, calculating the lethality of CAS
against a specified mix of target types (e.g., tank,
infantry, armored personnel carriers) for each point on the
battlefield under ideal battlefield conditions; second,
scaling that lethality value by four conditions that may
degrade CAS from its optimal effectiveness: pilot
proficiency, the enemy anti-air threat level, the target
acquisition methods of the forward air controller (FAC) , and
battlefield visibility.
The result of these calculations is a single value
associated with each point in the battle area and each time
t. The collection of these single point values is a "combat
power potential surface" which is suitable for employment as
a graphical display, superimposed upon the terrain display
of the battle area. When each point value is appropriately
keyed to color, the combat power potential surface readily
displays to a commander his capacity to mass firepower in
different battlefield areas and at different times.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The principles of mass and economy of force dictate
that a commander should bring to bear overwhelming combat
power against the enemy at critical points (mass), while
maintaining the minimal forces elsewhere to deter defeat
(economy of force) . A major challenge a commander faces is
determining when and where those critical points occur on
the battlefield, and deploying his forces in a manner that
allows him to exploit them as they occur. Mastering this
challenge is one of the arts of military command in war. A
tool that allows a commander to visualize his potential for
force massing that results from his tactical decisions will
surely assist him in this endeavor.
Investigating the use of computer graphics to develop
such a visualization tool was the aim of the U.S. Army's
Battle Enhanced Analysis Methodologies (BEAM) project [Ref
.
1] . Work done by Lamont [Ref. 1], Kemple and Larson [Ref.
2], and Larson, Kemple, and Dryer [Ref. 3] aimed at
developing graphical displays of combat potential or
destructive potential. Such displays allow the
visualization of a force' s ability to do damage to an enemy
across a battlefield and at any time. These authors
constructed quantitative expressions, cast in units of
"expected kills per minute,'' for the lethal power of
friendly weapon systems at all points over a specific
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terrain at any time. Lamont and Larson et al. addressed
themselves to direct fire weapons, while Kemple and Larson
quantified the lethal power of indirect fire weapons. They
then generated spatio-temporal graphical displays which
permit the visualizing of combat potential for direct [Ref
.
l:p. 48, 50-54] and indirect fire [Ref. 2:p. 31-33] weapons.
These displays are spatio-temporally dynamic in that
they show combat potential, or the capacity to harm the
enemy, at all points at any time. Naturally, no force can
apply combat power to all points at any or all times.
However, by visually depicting combat potential across the
battlefield and over sequential times the display allows a
commander to see where and when his combat potential is
massed. Different tactical decisions will produce different
possible massings of combat potential, and so different or
varying combat potential surfaces. Thus, the graphical
displays generated by the BEAM project serve as aids for
tactical decision making, planning future operations, and
training of battle staffs.
As a spatio-temporal representation of "combat power
potential" (as it is later called in this thesis), this
surface has four dimensions: time and three spatial
dimensions.
Two of the spatial dimensions of the surface are the
length and breadth of the battlefield. The third spatial
2
dimension is the surface height: the height at point x,y is
the value in "expected kills per minute" that would occur
if every weapon that could engage targets at x,y did so at
their maximum sustained rate of fire, and if all killed
targets were instantaneously replaced. This value changes
over the length and breadth of the battlefield. A higher
value for expected kills per minute at a given x,y point
equates to a greater surface height. The force can bring
more firepower to bear at that point than at a point with a
lower surface height, i.e., lower expected kills per minute.
For the two dimensional graphical displays generated by
the BEAM project, surface height is keyed to a recognizable
color scheme: higher heights, indicating greater combat
potential, are depicted in brighter colors, red and yellow.
Lower heights are depicted in greens and blues. There are,
of course, other ways to visually depict the varying combat
power potential surface: surface height could be keyed to
other colors, to intensity of color, or depicted as a
three-dimensional surface in the proper computing
environment.
The combat potential surface also has the quality of
durability or sustainability through time. As time
advances, the surface may grow or diminish in height at
various points on the battlefield, reflecting the waxing and
waning of combat power potential as battlefield and other
conditions change.
Thus far, these graphical displays have utilized
quantitative expressions for the lethality of direct and
indirect fire weapons. Yet the Commander of a Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) , the combat organization of
U.S. Marine Corps forces, typically has at his disposal
three types of weapon systems: direct fire weapons (e.g.,
tanks, heavy machine guns, anti-tank weapons, etc.),
indirect fire weapons (e.g., artillery, mortars, etc.), and
close air support (e.g., F/A-18, AV-8B aircraft). The
purpose of this thesis is to provide a quantitative
expression for the lethality of the third combat arm, close
air support (CAS) . This quantitative expression will be
additive to those already developed for direct and indirect
fire weapons. This will allow either visualization of
combat potential by type of weapon system or a single,
comprehensive visualization of the total combat potential of
a MAGTF across the battlefield as the Commander desires.
This thesis is divided into eight chapters.
The first chapter, the Introduction, provides the
general context for the thesis.
In the second chapter, a background discussion examines
in greater detail previous work of the BEAM project in which
the battlefield lethality of various weapons was quantified.
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In the third chapter, a general method for determining
the lethality of close air support against particular target
types is described. CAS lethality is expressed as "kills
per minute" to make it additive to the units of direct and
indirect fire lethality.
In the fourth chapter, the limits that time and space
impose on the availability of CAS are considered, and a
method of incorporating those limits into the expression for
CAS lethality is described.
In the fifth chapter, other battlefield factors that
limit or degrade the efficacy of CAS lethality are examined,
and a method of incorporating those limiting factors into
the general expression for CAS lethality is presented.
The full and final model for CAS combat power potential
is summarized in the sixth chapter.
The seventh chapter presents an example of a combat
power potential surface based on lethality values for close
air support calculated using the methodology developed in
this thesis.
The eighth and last chapter is a general conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND
This chapter consists of four parts. In the first, the
seminal work of Colonel T. Dupuy in quantifying weapon
lethality is briefly examined, along with some broad
differences and similarities to that of the BEAM project.
In the second, the work of Lamont in quantifying direct fire
weapon lethality is surveyed in greater detail. In the
third part, Kemple and Larson's work in quantifying indirect
fire lethality is examined. The fourth part develops a
single, descriptive phrase for the "combat potential" or
"destructive potential" index.
A. DUPUY AND TEE QUANTIFIED JUDGMENT MODEL
One aim of combat modellers and analysts is to quantify
the battlefield lethality of the heterogenous weapons
available to a modern combat commander. One of the most
thorough, if not well-received, attempts to do this in
recent times was made by Colonel T. N. Dupuy (U.S. Army,
Ret.) in his Quantified Judgment Model (QJM) [Ref. 4, Ref.
5] . Dupuy defines weapon lethality as "the inherent
capability of a given weapon to kill personnel, or to make
material ineffective in a given period of time, where
capability includes the factors of weapon range, rate of
fire, accuracy, radius of effects, and battlefield mobility"
[Ref. 4: p. 19]. While Dupuy' s final mathematical
expression for weapon lethality is a dizzying collection of
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factors (28 different factors for close air support), some
derived from analysis of the weapon itself (e.g., rate of
fire) and others from historical data (e.g., target
dispersion), his fundamental method is very appealing.
Dupuy argues that a weapon' s lethality can be
quantified by combining two factors: 1) a weapon's "proving
ground" lethality, i.e., "the maximum possible lethality
under ideal conditions," and 2) "a variety of realistic
combat variables, such as the effects of weather, terrain,
season, mobility characteristics, and vulnerability" [Ref.
4:p. 30]. The former factor Dupuy calls the Operational
Lethality Index, or OLI, and the latter combat variables.
The product of OLI and combat variables is combat power
[Ref. 4:p. 42] or combat power potential [Ref. 4:p. 46].
The specifics of Dupuy' s approach have not been
universally accepted amongst combat modelers and operations
analysts, nor is his model suitable for all lethality
calculations. Dupuy' s approach generalizes combat potential
over a terrain type, a method suitable for highly aggregated
combat models. Further, Dupuy explicitly excludes time from
direct consideration in his model [Ref. 4:p. 38]. These
characteristics preclude direct application of much of
Dupuy' s work to the sort of spatio-temporal, high
resolution, graphical display envisioned by the BEAM project
and this author. Nevertheless, his general method of
8
establishing ideal lethality and then modifying it by
battlefield conditions (albeit general ones) has been taken
up by others working on the BEAM project, with some crucial
differences.
The principal difference between work accomplished
under the BEAM project and Dupuy is that in the former
weapon "proving ground" lethality is modified by specific
battlefield conditions, while the latter used general
condition types. For instance, Dupuy modified "proving
ground" lethality by a multiplier representing terrain,
using one of twelve terrain categories [Ref. 4:p. 228].
Lamont, on the other hand, employed a high resolution
approach in which line-of-sight between a firing position
and every x,y point on the battlefield was calculated.
Also, BEAM project members used "expected kills per
minute" as the dimension for combat potential, unlike Dupuy
who used a dimensionless index called "combat power."
In the BEAM project's work, a graphical display of the
resulting values for weapon lethality was created, called a
"combat potential surface" by Lamont [Ref. l:p. 36], and
"destructive potential surface" by Kemple and Larson [Ref.
2:p. 31]. This combat potential surface ties weapon
lethality to specific geographical points by including
range, ground trafficability, observer locations, and
line-of-sight in the calculations. The result is a "contour
9
map" of combat potential for a terrain area, with colors
indicating relatively higher (e.g., yellow, red) and lower
(e.g., green, blue) areas of combat potential [Ref. 2:pp.
31-33, Ref. 3:pp. 19-20]. Two important points regarding
this work are:
1. The combat potential value, i.e., "expected kills
per minute," for each point on the battlefield is not
intended to predict actual kills expected of a weapon system
in combat. Two aspects of the value make this
interpretation impossible.
First, the value presupposes instantaneously and
inexhaustibly replaced targets at the value's point, a clear
impossibility.
Second, each point on the battlefield has such a
combat power potential value associated with it at every
time, representing the combat power that could be generated
if every weapon capable of engaging targets at that point
did so. This would require each weapon to fire at all
points within its range simultaneously. This is also
clearly impossible.
Rather, the value allows comparison between
surfaces, or between various tactical alternatives
considered by a commander. The tactical alternative with
the higher expected kills per minute at point x,y could be
expected to cause more damage to an enemy at x,y than that
10
with a lower expected kills per minute, but not necessarily
produce the actual kill rate indicated by its combat
potential value.
2. The calculation of combat potentials is not
intended as an academic exercise only, but to serve as an
aid to tactical decision making by displaying those values
as a combat potential surface. Whether used to assist in
combat, combat planning, or peacetime training, the combat
potential surface is tied to a specific landscape. By
altering his weapons mix or maneuvering his forces to
different locations, a commander can create different combat
potentials across the battlefield. Areas where a commander
has created the ability to mass his fires will have greater
combat potential, and hence display a higher combat
potential surface. This is in distinction to Dupuy who
never resolved his "combat power" index below the level of a
general terrain type. For Dupuy, an entire battlefield has
a single and unchanging combat power value for each force;
the combat potential surface, on the other hand, has a value
for each point on the battlefield, a value which changes
continuously as the friendly force maneuvers.
With these points in mind, the extension of Dupuy'
s
fundamental method to direct and indirect fire systems can
be examined more closely.
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B. DIRECT FIRE LETHALITY
Lamont [Ref. 1] adopted Dupuy' s approach to calculating
Operational Lethality Indices (OLI) for each weapon system
on the battlefield after altering it for his own purposes
(while keeping the same name; Lamont' s OLI, however, is
emphatically not the same calculation as Dupuy' s OLI). For
each point x,y on the battlefield, imagine a target which is
instantaneously replaced by a target of the same type after
being killed. To determine the expected number of kills of
such instantaneously replaced targets, Lamont envisioned
four factors that would effect the expected kill rate at a
given point x,y:
1. Rounds per minute, or rate of fire, for weapon w
against targets of type t, designated KWJ , RWj, > 0;
2. Probability of hit and kill of target type t by
weapon w at range r, designated prwt , </?r,w/ < 1;
3. Line of sight, a binary variable of 1 (if line of
sight exists between weapon w and point x,y and the target
is within range) or (if no line of sight exists or if the
target is beyond the weapon's range), designated L WJt^y
;
and,
4. Fraction of the enemy force of target type t,
designated ft ; </,<!.
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The last factor, ft , is required to account for weapon
platforms with multiple weapons, each of which is used to
best effect against different target types and cannot be
used simultaneously. For instance, the Bradley Fighting
Vehicle has a Tube-launched, Optically-sighted, Wire-guided
(TOW) missile for principal use against tanks, and a chain
gun for use against armored personnel carriers (APCs)
.
Each weapon has a different rate of fire and probability of
kill against its intended target. By multiplying the OLI by
the factor ft , the resulting combat potential is adjusted to
account for the different characteristics of the platform's
individual weapons.
For instance, suppose that 20% of an enemy force
consists of tanks, and 80% consists of APCs. Then the TOW,
with its fire rate and kill probability against tanks,
contributes 20% of the total combat potential, and the chain
gun contributes the remaining 80%.
The combat potential for a force, then, is defined as
the product of these four factors, summed over each target
type and each friendly weapon; this is Lamont's OLI [Ref.
l:p. 44, Ref. 2:p. 26]
:
CPd/[x,yJ =10LIw (x,y) ^ZZftRwsLw&yPw
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C. INDIRECT FIRE LETHALITY
Kemple and Larson (hereafter KL) extended Dupuy'
s
fundamental approach to indirect fire weapons, specifically
to artillery support. Adopting the same modifications of
Dupuy as Lamont, KL postulated a maximum probability of kill
for an artillery salvo against a tank or APC, using Dual
Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM), as />max = 0.9.
They then multiplied this probability by the rounds per
minute Rw an artillery piece is capable of firing, giving
the expected kills per minute. This figure in turn is
multiplied by the output of three degradation functions that
account for the limitations that artillery units face in a
particular battlefield. The range of these functions is
between zero and one, representing:
1- /ivTi)* multiplicative degradation of kill
probability due to the distance r\, between an artillery
forward observer (FO) and a point x,y, given that line of
sight exists;
2- fi^r-i)-, multiplicative degradation of kill
probability due to the distance ri , between the point x,y,
and a target reference point (TRP) , i.e., a known point on
the ground, such as a survey reference point; and,
3. h\s); multiplicative degradation of kill
probability due to the terrain trafficability at x,y,s,
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incorporating the influence of soil conditions, vegetation,
slope, obstacles, etc., on target speed.
Each of these degradation functions decreases in its
argument: /J(x),J = 1,2,3; Jt = ri, 7*2,5 $ such that ft(x) -* as the
relevant measured quantity increases, and fj(x) -* 1 as it
decreases. Under ideal conditions, i.e., a stationary-
target with zero distance between the FO and the target and
zero distance between a TRP and the target,
//(*)= 1, j= 1,2,3; X = r\,r2,S, and no degradation of the
expected kills per minute occurs. The destructive potential
for indirect fire, which KL also call the sum of Operational
Lethality Indices for each weapon w, is defined as [Ref
.
2:p. 30]:
DPfay) = !OLlfay) = lRvf3(s)f2(r2 )fi(ri)Pmax .
This is the essence of KL' s approach to calculating
"destructive potential" [Ref. 2:p. 30]. Two points should
be noted:
1. Calculation of the three degradation factors is
abstracted from any particular enemy target, but tied to a
particular terrain area and trafficability. That is, for
each point x,y on the battlefield, an infinite supply of
instantaneously replaced enemy targets is hypothesized, and
the three degradation factors (and line of sight) for that
point are calculated. When this value is determined for
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every point x,y on the battlefield, the result is the combat
potential surface, or destructive potential surface, for the
battlefield.
2. The common dimension of destructive potential for
direct and indirect fire (i.e., expected kills per minute)
allows the construction of a combined destructive potential
surface by simply adding the destructive potentials of
direct and indirect fire together for each point x,y.
Similar potentials calculated for other weapons, e.g., close
air support, can be added to these sums, to provide
ultimately a cumulative destructive potential that reflects
the summed potentials of a commander' s full range of
supporting arms.
This is not to suggest that the actual combat
power generated from the potential is additive across weapon
systems; it is not. Combat power is a non-linear
aggregation that depends on many factors. See the
discussion of combat potential and power in Section D.
At times a commander may want to view this combined
destructive potential. At other times, however, the surface
for e.g., indirect fire weapons alone, may be all he wishes
to see. The destructive potential surface developed in this
thesis will be capable of providing these aggregated or
disaggragated views of destructive potential.
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D. THE DYNAMICS OF COMBAT: POWER V. POTENTIAL
In an attempt to bring order and scientific rigor to
the study of combat, Hughes states in his Combat Science: An
Organizing Study [Ref . 6] that he
. . . aims to fill a great need to clean up
the language of warfare, so that war colleges can
teach concepts unambiguously, officers can
communicate their combat experience clearly, and
analysts can report what they have learned to each
other and to the officer leadership with less
confusion. [Ref. 6:p. iv]
In this spirit, it seems advantageous to propose a
single term or phrase that captures the "combat potential"
of Lamont, the "destructive potential" of KL, and the
"combat power" or "combat power potential" of Dupuy. Rather
than muddying the waters with an arbitrarily chosen phrase,
it also seems advantageous to base any descriptive term(s)
on the only attempt to standardize the language of warfare
analysis this author is aware of: the work of The Military
Conflict Institute (TMCI) and Hughes [Ref. 6] and Hughes, et
al. [Ref. 7] . To that end, a basic familiarity with some of
the applicable axioms and definitions of these author's
works seems in order.
Hughes offers the following definitions of combat
potential and combat power:
Combat potential is a reservoir of resources
and skills, like infantrymen, arms, and training.
The ammunition in a warship's magazine is a
component of combat potential, as are the ship's
17
fire control system and trained fire control
technicians. [Ref. 6:p. iii]
Combat power is the rate at which delivered
combat energy affects the enemy [in a] battle.
The results it achieves are in the form of
casualties, destruction, fear, demoralization, and
suppression of enemy movement, return fire,
thought and initiative. Combat power is, and only
can be, measured by its effect on the enemy.
[Ref. 6:p. iii]
Elsewhere he elaborates,
Potential is loosely like the capacity to
accomplish work on a battlefield. It is not a
shooting rate but a magazine capacity - the number
of shots carried or arrows in a quiver. [Ref.
6:p. 3-3]
Combat potential, then, is the latent capacity to do
the work of combat, to destroy the enemy's physical, mental,
and spiritual assets for the purpose of dominating him.
Combat power, on the other hand, does not exist without
actual combat. Hughes further divides combat potential into
two types:
Designed combat potential is the notional
capacity of a force to achieve useful results in
combat when performing its intended function, and
optimally trained, equipped, supported, motivated,
and led. [Ref. 6:p. 3-2]
Available combat potential is the actual
capacity of a force to achieve useful results in
combat in the existing situation with its existing
organization, training, equipping, support,
motivation, and leadership. [Ref. 6:p. 3-2]
Designed combat potential is potential abstracted the
furthest from the circumstances of combat. It is the
doctrinal organization of a unit, when it is manned to its
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Table of Organization strength, equipped to its Table of
Equipment level, and fully motivated and led by the best
officers and non-commissioned officers. In short, it is an
ideal, similar to Dupuy' s OLI.
Available combat potential takes us one step closer to
the condition of units actually engaged in combat by
incorporating deficiencies in personnel strength and
quality, equipment shortages or inadequate maintenance, and
training and leadership shortfalls. However, available
combat potential makes no reference to the degradations in
ideal capacity caused by a particular environment or enemy
posture. It purports to describe actual combat capacities
just short of the battlefield.
In the context of these definitions, it can be seen
that Lamont and KL have quantified neither pure combat
potential nor pure combat power.
They have not quantified what Hughes et al. refer to as
"combat potential" (designed or available) because their
quantifications explicitly account for line of sight and
other restrictions imposed by a particular battlefield.
They have not quantified combat power, either, because
they do not consider enemy attrition in the combat potential
surface.
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What these authors have quantified is something more
than combat potential, but less than combat power, what may
be called power potential 1 .
Power potential may be defined as the rate at which
weapon systems could deliver lethal fire to any point on the
battlefield, at any time, accounting for particular and
relevant battlefield and enemy characteristics.
Note that power potential may not necessarily precisely
predict real casualty-producing capability.
Note, also, that this definition does not allow for
"force multipliers," i.e., factors which amplify the rate of
delivery or effect, of lethal fire. This is in distinction
to Dupuy, who allows the factor of "Air Superiority" to
range above one in value, thereby making it a variable with
amplifying influence on the value of the OLI for close air
support [Ref. 4:p. 230].
With this definition in hand, it remains to be seen how
the power potential of close air support, PPcASr can be
quantified. Following Dupuy' s method, this involves two
steps:
1. Determine the "proving ground" lethality of close
air support, i.e., "the maximum possible lethality under
ideal conditions" [Ref. 4:p. 30];
This term was coined by Profs. Hughes and Kemple in a discussion with the author regarding this thesis on
10 April 1997.
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2. Identify and quantify the "variety of realistic
combat variables'' [Ref. 4:p. 30] that degrade the "proving
ground" lethality of close air support.
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III. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT LETHALITY
In this chapter, after defining ""sortie," a method for
calculating the "proving ground" lethality of close air
support (CAS) will be presented. This method will consist
of eight steps linked to the weaponeering procedures for CAS
planning found in the Joint Munitions Effectiveness
Manual/Air Support - Visual Deliveries (JMEM/AS) [Ref. 8]
and Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual/Air-To-Surface --
Weaponeering Guide [Ref. 11] . The end result of this
chapter will be a mathematical expression for the lethality
of CAS in units of expected kills per minute.
In accordance with the MAGTF Aviation Planning
publication, a "sortie" is "an operational flight by one
aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)" [Ref. 9:p. H-15] . Reference 10
defines "sortie" similarly as "one flight of one aircraft to
conduct a single mission" [Ref. 10:Glossary, p. 13] . The
same reference also defines "pass" as an "aircraft maneuver
conducted to release weapons on a target" [Ref. 10:Glossary,
p. 11] . Moreover, in the context of the JMEM/AS, "sortie"
and "pass" are used interchangeably to mean a single
aircraft's traversal over a target during which ordnance is,
or could have been, released. Whenever multiple passes are
referred to in the JMEM/AS, it is always explicitly stated
as a "number of passes." In this thesis, therefore,
"sortie" or "pass" will always mean a single traversal by an
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aircraft over a ground target for the purpose of delivering
ordnance.
The "kills per minute" for CAS, then, may be calculated
by working through the following steps, each of which is
explained in greater detail below:
1. Stipulate the appropriate target damage criterion
for each target type.
2. Stipulate the desired probability of achieving the
specified target damage criterion for each target type.
3. Determine the single sortie probability of damage
for the applicable combination of ordnance and target type.
4
.
Determine the expected number of sorties required
to achieve the specified target damage for each target type.
5. Calculate the "kills per sortie" for each target
type.
6. Calculate the "sorties per minute" available from
each applicable squadron for each target type.
7. Calculate the expected kills per minute for each
target type.
8. Calculate the total expected kills per minute at
each point x,y on the battlefield by adjusting for the
expected mix of target types.
Step 1
. Stipulate an appropriate target damage
criterion. For each target type known to be in the battle
area, a damage criteria must be specified. For example,
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functioning in a defensive
role within 12 hours. [Ref.
ll:p. 6-1]
Armored Vehicles:
M-Kill. Damage to the




F-Kill. Damage to the
vehicle main armament so that
direct fire on a target
cannot be completed.
K-Kill. Damage to the
vehicle so that it is not
economically feasible to make
repairs and the vehicle is
fit only for cannabalization
of parts.
P-Kill. Incapacitation of




Step 2 . Stipulate the desired probability of achieving
the specified target damage criterion. Reference 11
provides "general recommendations for suitable probabilities
of damage where the aim is to destroy or significantly
damage the target ..." [Ref. ll:p. 2-7]. For point
targets, 0.70 to 0.80 is the recommended range for the
probability of damage.
While it may be tempting for the planner to stipulate a
desired probability of damage of .99 or even 1, higher
values will require a greater number of passes or sorties to
achieve the desired probability of damage. This in turn
will reduce the power potential values for CAS due to the
constraint on available sorties.
Step 3 . Using the tables in the JMEM/AS [Ref. 8],
determine the single sortie probability of damage (also
referred to as single pass probability of damage, or
expected fractional damage) r denoted SSPd, for a combination
of ordnance and target. This is defined as the "probability
of damaging a single target element randomly located within
the target area" [Ref. 10:Glossary, p. 5] . This value is
available provided the following information is known:
a. Ordnance type, e.g., Mk-83, Mk-82, Mk-81,
bombs.
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b. Target type, e.g., Personnel, Armored vehicles
(vehicle type), Field and AA Artillery, Field
Fortifications, Airfields, etc.
c. Terrain type, e.g., open, marsh grass, jungle
tangle, rain forest, temperate forest, etc.
d. Target Posture, e.g., personnel standing,
prone, or in foxholes, armored vehicles in the open, in
revetments, etc.
e. Fuse, e.g., instantaneous, high setting,
superquick, etc.
f. Delivery method, e.g., unaccelerated or dive
delivery (2 or 4 Gs)
.
g. Release angle, e.g., 0, 10, 20, 30, or 45
degrees.
h. Release altitude, e.g., 2500 ft.
i. Circular Error Probable (CEP) of the ordnance,
e.g., 5, 10, 20, or 40 mils.
Not all of this information is relevant for the type of
calculations envisioned in this thesis. The value of power
potential for CAS is sought for a particular combination of
ordnance, target, and terrain type, but abstracted from any
particular target posture, fuse type, delivery method,
release angle or altitude, or CEP. In short, the SSPd
values in the JMEM/AS are too specific and contain too much
detail for direct use.
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An approximate or generalized SSPd can be obtained by
fixing the ordnance, target type, and terrain type
variables, and averaging probabilities over the remaining
variables: target posture, fuse, delivery method, release
angle, release altitude, and CEP. In order to distinguish
the resulting value from the SSPD of the JMEM/AS, this
averaged single sortie probability of damage will be denoted
SSPD<>|ta,te to indicate that the terrain type and a particular
combination of target and ordnance type are specified while
the other factors are averaged. The ordnance-target
combination is expressed as o\ta to indicate that ordnance
is selected for a given target type.
Step 4 . Using the desired probability of damage
determined in step two above, and the SSPD |ta,te values from
step three, determine the "expected number of sorties for a
desired fractional damage" from the JMEM/AS charts [Ref
.
8:Appendix A], denoted hereafter as Joi^te . (Note: the
JMEM/AS returns fractional values for J |ta,te .
)
Step 5
. Take the reciprocal of Jo|ta^e to get the number
of kills (where "kill" = achieving the desired damage) per
sortie obtainable for a given combination of ordnance,
target, and terrain type. Denoting this as K |ta,te , we have:
kills per sortie = Ko|ta,te = ~
'o|ta,te
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Step 6 . Having determined the kills per sortie, it is
necessary to calculate the number of sorties per minute that
the supporting squadron is capable of providing to help
fight the ground war. This is no simple calculation, but a
complex function of aircraft reliability and maintenance
factors, aviation logistics, and pilot availability. This
calculation is done for us, however, in the MAGTF Air
Tasking Cycle. This planning cycle, during which available
air assets are matched to the MAGTF Commander's battle plan,
consists of four phases [Ref. 9:p. 4/2-4/4]:
Phase I; Apportionment and Allocation .
1. Apportionment . In this phase, the total level of
effort that should be dedicated to various types of air
operations or tasks is determined for a given period of
time, typically 24 hours, by priority or percentage.
2. Allocation . In allocation, the priorities
expressed by the MAGTF Commander are translated into the
total number of sorties (by aircraft type) available for
each task. For instance, after consideration of maintenance
factors and pilot availability, the Air Combat Element (ACE)
Commander may determine that he has 40 sorties available for
Offensive Anti-Air Warfare, 20 for air defense, and 40
sorties for Offensive Air Support (of which 15 may be for
air interdiction, 10 for armed reconnaissance, and 15 for
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CAS) . It is during this phase that pre-planned air support
requests are turned into scheduled and on-call missions.
Phase II; Allotment . During this phase the sorties
previously allocated are now distributed to support the
elements of the MAGTF. This permits the MAGTF elements to
integrate their assigned sorties into their plan for fire
and maneuver.
Phase III: Tasking . In this phase the division of
sorties decided on in previous phases is put into formal
orders and passed to the units involved in the form of an
Air Tasking Order (ATO) . The ATO provides specific sortie
information to include, but not limited to, the mission
number, the tasked and supported unit, the priority, mission
times (time on station, time on target, etc.), mission
location, ordnance type, and number and type of aircraft.
Phase IV: Scheduling . Squadrons assigned missions in
the ATO now, upon receipt of the order, assign individual
aircraft and air crews to specific missions and promulgate
squadron flight schedules. This completes the Air Tasking
Cycle.
For any given 24 hour period the Allocation portion of
Phase I provides the number of sorties assigned a CAS
mission. Taking advantage of that fact, let
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n = number of sorties allocated a CAS mission (either
scheduled or on-call) for a 24 hour period. Sorties per
minute, R, are calculated as
n— nK 1440 •
Step 7 . Determine the kills per minute by multiplying
sorties per minute and kills per sortie: .
RKo\ta,te -
Step 8 . Since the terrain type will be considered
constant over the battlefield, the te subscript can be
removed from K above as it will not vary for a given
planning or combat scenario. On the other hand, a factor
indicating the fraction of the enemy force made up of a
target type must be added to reflect that a sortie is
assigned a single target at a time. The resulting
expression will be summed over all potential targets. In
short, the total expected kills per minute for each point
x,y on the battlefield within flight range of an attacking
aircraft and for a 24 hour period is:
ZftaRK
\
ta , Vx,y (1).
As previously mentioned, the o|ta subscript (which
reads, "ordnance o, given target fca") is a particular
combination of target and ordnance determined likely to
produce the desired damage level. There are numerous
sources for guiding selection of appropriate ordnance for a
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target type, the JMEM/AS [Ref. 11] being one. This
target-ordnance linkage is necessary to avoid postulating
unlikely combinations of ordnance and target, such as
Maverick guided missiles against personnel in the open, or
firebombs (napalm) against tanks.
This eight step calculation provides the "proving
ground," or ideal, lethality of CAS in units of expected
kills per minute. This lethality is highly abstract,
however, unmodified by spatio-temporal conditions that set
sharp limits on CAS usefulness over a real battlefield.
Addressing these spatio-temporal limits and incorporating
them into (1) above is the subject of the next chapter.
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IV. SPATIO-TEMPORAL LIMITATIONS ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
One of the great advantages of CAS aircraft is its
ability to appear anywhere over the battlefield at any time
to deliver lethal support to friendly forces on the ground.
The "flip side" of this advantage is that CAS aircraft
cannot be everywhere over the battlefield at all times; it
has unambiguous time and space limitations which must be
considered in planning. By appropriately selecting basing
or refueling points and aircraft alert posture (i.e., air or
ground alert), a commander can do much towards making
decisive air support available at critical times in the
battle. By incorporating time and space considerations in
power potential calculations, the impact of such selections
on power potential can be explicitly represented. First,
however, the Marine Corps' planning and control measures for
CAS must be understood.
The conduct of CAS as practiced by the Marine Corps
falls into two general categories: pre-planned air support
and immediate air support [Ref . 12, Ref . 13, Ref . 14]
.
Pre-planned support is CAS provided according to a detailed
plan conceived before ground operations are executed; the
Air Tasking Order (ATO) is such a plan. Immediate support
is CAS designed to meet specific urgent requests by the
ground forces which arise in the course of a battle and
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cannot be reasonably foreseen. Pre-planned support can be
further divided into two types:
1. Pre-planned Scheduled Missions (PSM)
Pre-planned scheduled missions (PSM) are CAS missions
which receive detailed mission coordination and planning in
advance. Requesting units specify a time for execution and
the supporting aircraft is assigned a time-on-target (TOT)
.
The target type and location are specified, as well as the
supporting aircraft and suitable ordnance. For PSM,
response time and availability are not issues: missions are
flown by a schedule, and aircraft availability has already
been settled in the Apportionment and Allocation Phases of
air support planning.
2. Pre-planned On-Call Missions (POM)
POMs are CAS missions in which specific aircraft are
loaded with ordnance for a specific target (or target type)
,
and then placed in a ground or air alert status. The
supported unit then requests execution of the mission when
it is needed. These missions are also planned for in the
ATO, with a time window specified during which the mission
is likely to be requested. For POMs, response time and
availability are critical issues: POM aircraft in a ground
alert status far from the battle area will have a much
greater response time than the same aircraft in an air alert
status, i.e., flying in an orbit point just outside the
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range of enemy anti-air weapons. The tradeoff is that
aircraft in an orbit pattern require periodic refueling,
making them unavailable for a period of time. Limitations
on aircrew cumulative flight time, as well as periodic
aircraft maintenance requirements, also set limits on the
availability of air alert aircraft.
With immediate CAS, aircraft enroute to a pre-planned
target must be diverted to meet an urgent request by a
ground unit. Since immediate CAS is not planned, there is
little a MAGTF or ACE commander can do to reduce response
times and increase availability that he does not already do
for PSM and POM aircraft. In effect, increasing the number
(and flexibility) of POM and PSM sorties is the only way to
meet the demand of random, immediate CAS requests. This
makes the management of POM and PSM sorties of central
importance to reducing response times and ensuring aircraft
availability for ground forces.
The challenge, then, is to visualize PPcas in a way
that highlights the CAS power potential available at
different times over the battlefield as a function of
tactical decisions by the commander. The offensive air
support planner can then visualize different power potential
distributions by altering the following factors under his
control:
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• the location of ground-alert POM aircraft, e.g.,
ship- or ground-based, the use of Forward Arming and
Refueling Points (FARPs) or Vertical and Short
Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) pads in close proximity
to the battle area;
• the location of the orbit point for air-alert POM
aircraft, and,
• the number of aircraft in air alert and ground
alert, respectively, awaiting on-call missions.
Let us assume that whether an aircraft can reach a
point on the battlefield in order to attack a target is
binary: the point either is or is not within the aircraft's
range at the time of interest. Let us then use Za,AiertjcyJ >
with a discrete range of zero and one, to indicate this
capability for each point on the battlefield, where
a = aircraft type, i.e., F/A-18 or AV-8B,
Alert = alert status of the aircraft, i.e., GA (ground
alert) or AA (air alert),
xy = point x,y on the battlefield, and
t = time elapsed from t = 0, expressed in minutes.
The two principal CAS aircraft (F/A-18D and AV-8B) in
the Marine Corps inventory will typically travel at 500 kias
(knots indicated air speed) in delivering ordnance on a
target, but travel at different speeds to maximize their
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endurance in the air (250 kias for the F/A-18D and 230 kias
for the AV-8B) [Ref . 9:p. G-l] . These different speeds may
be accounted for in calculating transit times, and can be
reflected in the following notation:
kidSajc - knots indicated air speed for aircraft a for
flight type k, where a = F/A-18D or AV-8B, and k = del
(ordnance delivery speed) or max (maximum endurance speed),
e.g., kiaSAV-ZBjoia. ~ 230;
Bj = aircraft base i, i = 1,2,3 . . . , where Bt is
a x,y pair of Cartesian coordinates;
L* - minimum loiter time over target required for a
sortie to be launched.
We can also use d, subscripted to identify from and to
locations, to designate horizontal (Euclidean) distance
between two points of interest:
ds^xy ~ distance from aircraft base B to point x,y.
Other terms that will be required are:
Rangea = maximum flight endurance time for aircraft a,
expressed in minutes of flight, e.g., RangeF/A-nD=lQ3
minutes;
tk = time (in minutes) required for ground alert
aircraft to get airborne after receiving a mission;
/ = clock time (in minutes from t = 0) an aircraft
in air or ground alert status receives a mission.
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a. Ground Alert
For on-call aircraft in ground alert, determining
the value of the indicator variable Zajiert^yj for each point
in the battle area and at time t is a matter of two
calculations:
• Verifying that the time required to travel from
the aircraft's base (its place of ground alert)
to the point of interest and back is less than
the maximum flight time for the aircraft type
(condition 1 in the expression for Za,GA,xy,t
below)
;
• Determining, for each time t, whether the clock
time of aircraft arrival over the target is
less than t (condition 2 below)
.
For aircraft in ground alert at each base Bit we
determine the value of Z for each x,y on the battlefield, at
each time t, for all aircraft a as follows:
Za,GA,xy,t =
1 if <





For a given air support configuration then, i.e.,
given certain air base locations and readiness conditions of
supporting squadrons, PPcas for a point of interest on the
battlefield will change as t changes. Air combat power,
from ground alert aircraft, will become available to the
ground commander depending on:
• the proximity of ground alert aircraft to the
Forward Line of Troops (FLOT), [ds^xy) f
• time required to get ground alerted aircraft
airborne and en route to the target, (tk) ;
• clock time the strike aircraft receives the
execution order, (/') .
b. Air Alert
For on-call aircraft placed in an air alert status
in an orbit point, the situation is slightly different than
that for ground alert aircraft.
An aircraft in an air alert status is burning fuel
while circling in its orbit point awaiting a mission. The
radius of action for the aircraft is steadily shrinking over
time as its fuel diminishes. Since the aircraft must return
to base whether a mission is assigned or not, the pilot must
keep in reserve sufficient fuel to travel the distance to
the base. As time progresses, the pilot's situation might be
envisioned as depicted in Figure 1. As the aircraft's
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t=0
FLOT = Forward Line of Troops
Figure 1. Shrinking Radius of Action
for Air Alert Aircraft.
radius of action shrinks to t+40 (where t = 0), the pilot
might decide to return immediately to base, since he cannot
strike targets forward of the FLOT. Alternatively, he might
wait until t+50, when he must return to base or risk running
out of fuel. It is not necessary to model this decision
process of the pilot, but the shrinking radius of action
over time must be reflected in PPcas, particularly forward
of the FLOT.
To do this, we must be able to represent more
information. Let us define the following symbols:
toEP = time of aircraft departure for designated
orbit point;
dop-+xy = distance from the aircraft's orbit point
to point x,y.
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For an aircraft in air alert, a target can be
attacked if the sum of the distances between orbit point,
target location, and base are less than the maximum distance
the aircraft is capable of traveling at the time it is
ordered to attack the target, after allowing for some
minimum loiter time over the target. Since aircraft
typically measure fuel consumption in terms of minutes of
flight rather than terrestrial miles, we can exploit the
formula distance — speed * time and express our units in
terms of time. Therefore, a target at point x,y is within
range of an air alert aircraft if
total distance from OP to target and back to base
.
_. . _ . .
_,, „,
.
speed of transit +£*< Remaining Fit Time (la) .
The time when an air alert aircraft receives a
mission is critical because of its shrinking radius of
action as it remains in its orbit point. The remaining
flight time left to an air alert aircraft may be arrived at
as follows:
Elapsed Flight Time for Air Alert Aircraft = t-tDEp
Remaining Flight Time = Rangea -t+tDEP (2a).
The speed of transit which appears in (la) above
is not, however, a constant quantity. The varying speed of
aircraft in different legs of its journey to and from a
target, as noted above, must also be taken into account.
Let us assume that an aircraft travels at its ordnance
delivery speed in traveling from its orbit point to the
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target, and its maximum endurance speed in traveling back to
base after striking its target. Then,
total distance from OP to target and back to base
speed of transit
may be expressed as,
kkBaja + ktasajn* ( J3 ) •
Using (la), (2a), and (3a), two conditions can be
specified which jointly determine whether an air alert
aircraft can strike at point x,y at each time t:
• the sum of the time it takes to transit from
the orbit point to the target point, the time
it takes to transit from the target back to
base, and a minimum required amount of time
over the target, must be less than or equal to
the remaining flight time the aircraft is
capable of at the time of mission assignment,
that is,
•n^ + T^Z^ + L <Rangea -t + tDEp;
• for each time t, the clock time of aircraft
arrival over the target must be less than or
equal to t, that is,
f + TSft^t-
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Combining the indicator variable Z with (1) gives
the following calculation for PPcas:
Zajuenm ^ftaRKo\ta Vx,y Alert, t,a ( 2 )
.
This chapter has offered a way of incorporating
spatio-temporal limitations on CAS availability over the
battlefield by using a binary variable. The value of this
variable is calculated for every point x,y on the
battlefield and for every time t (minutes) . The resulting
expression (2) provides the power potential value of CAS
modified only by the general limitations of physics and
aircraft capacity. There are other limitations, however,
imposed by particular battlefield conditions. If each of
these conditions can be expressed as a number between zero
and one, then expected kills per minute for actual
battlefield/weapon system conditions can be expressed by
multiplying (2) by these quantified conditions. This is the
aim of the next chapter.
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V. FACTORS DEGRADING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT LETHALITY
The ideal value of the power potential of CAS against
any point on the battlefield at any time is degraded by a
number of factors:
• the pilot's experience level;
• the degree of enemy air threat in the area;
• target acquisition methods; and,
• visibility in the battlefield area.
In this chapter, each of these four degrading factors
will be examined in turn to assess its influence on CAS
"proving ground" lethality.
A. PILOT EXPERIENCE LEVEL
The ability of a CAS pilot to deliver lethal fire to a
designated target can be considered a function of two
variables: training and combat experience. While combat
experience may be interpreted as the number of combat flight
hours a pilot has accumulated, collecting and analyzing this
data for the purpose of assessing unit experience is too
cumbersome for ready use in the sort of decision aid
contemplated in this thesis.
On the other hand, aviation training, as a measure of
pilot proficiency, is monitored in the Fleet Marine Force
(FMF) by a comprehensive Training & Readiness (T&R) Program
[Ref. 15] that assigns a Combat Readiness Percentage (CRP)
to individual aviators based on their proficiency and
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currency in specific aviation skills. The CRP has four
levels [Ref. 15:p. 2-3]:
Combat Capable 60% CRP
Combat Ready 70% CRP
Combat Qualified 85% CRP
Full-Combat Qualified 100% CRP
Classification of a pilot into one of these four areas
depends on the number of events in his aircraft specialty
(MOS) he has satisfactorily completed (i.e., demonstrated
proficiency) within a specified time (i.e., the re-fly
factor) . A pilot increases his CRP by demonstrating
proficiency in more events in his MOS syllabus; he maintains
his CRP by demonstrating proficiency in events he has
completed in the past within the re-fly time for those
events. Demonstrating this proficiency, or re-qualifying,
within the re-fly time is how pilots maintain their
currency, yet only by showing proficiency in new events can
a pilot increase his CRP.
Currently, squadrons maintain an automated database of
CRPs for all squadron members, called the Aviation Training
Information Management System (ATRIMS) . The average CRP of
all aviators within a unit is a measure of the unit's combat
readiness. Scaling this value to between zero and one
(divide by 100) allows it to be appended to (2) as a
degrading factor:
unit average CRP
Pilot Proficiency = P = Jqq »
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which gives,
PZaMertjcyJ^LftaRK^a Vx,y Alert, t,d (3).
B. THREAT LEVEL
The degrading influence of the enemy anti-air threat on
CAS effectiveness is observed principally on the spatial
aspect of power potential.
Spatially, threat level reduces kills per minute, i.e.,
the "height" of the power potential surface, by forcing CAS
aircraft to employ tactics that reduce CAS accuracy. There
is no prescribed tactic for each level of threat that will
invariably be employed in each situation. Air tactics will
vary from squadron to squadron, pilot to pilot, and even
battle to battle. For instance, the classic ingress tactic
for CAS missions is to fly as close to the earth as
practical until the target area is reached. At that point,
the aircraft pops up to deliver its ordnance and then
performs a similar low level egress. This tactic relies
heavily on surrounding elevated terrain to mask the
aircraft's signature from electro-optical sensors. During
the Gulf War, however, many squadrons found that a high
ingress altitude, just out of range of shoulder-fired
surface-to-air missiles, allowed them to deliver ordnance
with a high degree of accuracy while keeping the aircraft
out of harm's way [Ref. 16].
47
The threat to friendly aircraft operation over the
battlefield is doctrinally divided into three levels, low,
medium, and high, depending on the type of antiaircraft
weapon systems present on the battlefield [Ref. 14:p. 2-2].
Each division is characterized by different weapon systems
in order of increasing lethality:
• Low
0. small arms
1. medium AA weapons
2. AAA w/limited optical acquisition (not
integrated)
• Medium
3. Radar, electro-optical acquisition (not fully
integrated)
4. Fully integrated fire control, degraded due to
terrain, weather, or other factors
• High
5. Fully integrated fire control, not degraded
6. Mobile SAMs




Due to the wide variety of possible responses to each
threat level, there is no known function that relates threat
level to its consequent impact on CAS effectiveness. The
only undisputed fact is that increased threat equates to
decreased CAS effectiveness. For this reason, in the
absence of a more precise functional relationship between
the two variables, a linear relationship will be adopted.
The value of the threat degradation factor, therefore,
is arrived at as follows: the absence of an anti-air threat
means T (threat degradation factor) = 1. For each of the
ten threat levels present on the battlefield, starting with
small arms, reduce T by one tenth of its rank. For
instance, if mobile SAMs are present on the battlefield,
then T = 1 - (.1*6)=. 4 . In general, the threat degradation
factor is calculated as follows:
T = 1 - .1* (threat rank)
Appending T to expression (3) above gives:
TPZarAiertwj ZftaRKoita Vx,>> Alert, t,a ( 4 ) .
A second factor which heavily influences CAS accuracy
is target acquisition method.
C. TARGET ACQUISITION METHOD
"Target acquisition" is the visual search process
involving three events: target detection, target
recognition, and target identification. When Laser Guided
Bombs (LGBs) or laser spot trackers (LSTs) are used, the
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search process includes non-visual "sighting" by an
aircraft /weapon sensor system which detects reflected laser
energy. In either case, the presence of a Forward Air
Controller (FAC) who directs the aircraft or weapon to the
target i's critical to a successful attack [Ref . 17] .
A ground- or air-based FAC is a required ingredient in
any CAS action. U.S. Marine Corps aviation doctrine [Ref.
17] mandates positive control of aircraft conducting CAS
missions by a FAC. This control consists of the ground- or
air-based FAC clearing an attacking aircraft ("cleared hot")
to release ordnance on the designated target. Though the
reasonable assurance doctrine allows a CAS aircraft, under
certain circumstances, to release ordnance without being
"cleared hot" by a FAC [Ref. 17], a FAC is still required to
mark and/or "lase" the target for the attacking aircraft.
Reasonable assurance is rarely invoked in peacetime,
however, and is unlikely to be invoked in war unless
battlefield conditions are unusually -grave. Should that
occur, CAS aircraft are still likely to receive terminal
guidance to a target by an officer or Staff NCO with
training in CAS procedures.
FAC guidance, then, is virtually a certainty in any
minimally controlled battlefield situation, whether the
ordnance is LGB or unguided bombs. How that guidance
ou
impacts on CAS accuracy is a function of the FAC s method of
designating the target.
Generally speaking, FAC methods can be roughly divided
into two classes: 1) those in which the FAC uses laser
range-finding or laser-designating equipment to "paint" the
target with a laser beam, an example of the latter being the
Modular Universal Laser Equipment (MULE), and 2) those in
which the FAC relies upon his own ability to judge the range
and bearing of a target from his own location or that of a
prominent terrain feature or mark (e.g., smoke or
phosphorous mark) . In the first class, the target
designating or ranging method is quite accurate; although
"false lasing, " which occurs when the FAC unknowingly lases
intervening terrain rather than the intended target, is a
possibility, it is sufficiently unlikely to occur when the
FAC is properly trained that it can be dismissed.
Consequently, the use of lasers to designate targets should
present no degradation to CAS accuracy at all.
Letting A represent the degradation factor
attributable to target acquisition methods and the subscript




When laser devices are not available, however, the FAC
must rely on his own ability to judge the distance of the
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target from his location or from a prominent terrain feature
or battlefield mark off of which he can guide the CAS pilot.
Considerable error can be introduced here in the FAC s
ability to judge distance, and this error must be quantified
and introduced into the power potential expression for CAS.
Over the last few decades, there has been a fair amount
of research conducted by experimental psychologists toward
developing a theory of space perception that relates true
distance, measured as a Euclidean straight line, to
estimated distance by human subjects. Attempts at
determining the functional relationship between true
distance and estimated distance have, in general, dealt with
two types of distance judgments: egocentric and exocentric.
Egocentric distance judgments are those in which the subject
estimates the distance between himself and an object;
exocentric, or interobject, distance judgments, are those in
which the subject estimates the distance between two objects
in a field of view. Both types of distance judgments relate
to FAC methods. While mathematical models exist in the
literature of experimental psychology for both egocentric
and exocentric distance judgments, there are advantages and
disadvantages to using either in calculating combat power
potentials. Each type of distance judgment and its model
will be examined in turn.
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1. Method A: Egocentric Distance Judgments
Field experiments with human subjects have consistently
shown that they misjudge the distance from themselves to an
object, and that the magnitude of this judgment error
changes as the true distance to the object increases [Ref.
18, Ref. 19, Ref. 20]. The nature and degree of that
misjudgment has been in some dispute, however, with
defenders for each of the four possible alternatives: a
nonlinear increasing [Ref. 19], nonlinear decreasing [Ref.
20], linear increasing [Ref. 21], or linear decreasing [Ref.
22] relationship.
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to resolve
this disagreement, it must be noted that, of the research
referenced above, only in the experiments of Galanter &
Galanter [Ref. 19] were true distances approximating those
under which a FAC would presumably operate used, i.e., 183
to 9017 meters [Ref. 19:p. 302]. Each of the other
researchers listed above conducted their experiments in
small open areas of 20 meters in diameter, and then
extrapolated their findings across distance in
general. It is not unlikely, however, that errors in
judging distance that appear linear over relatively small
distances (0-20 m) might become nonlinear over larger
distances (up to 10 km)
.
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In any event, after conducting field experiments in
which subjects estimated the slant range of an aircraft
passing in front of them at an altitude of 200 feet,
Galanter & Galanter found that the relationship between
magnitude estimates and true distance could be expressed by
the following function:
estimated distance = (true distance) 11
where n = 1.25. This relationship, and the value of n, have
been consistently reproduced by other researchers [Ref . 23,
Ref. 24] under similar experimental conditions. The value
of n = 1.25 indicates that errors in judging distance
increase with true distance at an increasing rate, i.e.,
they are non-linear. Graphically, the relationship appears
in Figure 2.
In order to fit this model into combat power potential
as a degrading factor, it is necessary to convert the
relationship between true distance and estimated distance
into a value ranging from zero (completely ineffective) to
one (no degradation of CAS effectiveness) . It is also
necessary to include a distance scaling factor which
reflects the limits of a FAC's usefulness. At some distance
from the FAC, his ability to guide aircraft to a target
becomes negligible. The curvature of the earth alone
presents a natural barrier to a FAC's line of sight, though
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Figure 2. Estimated Distance v. True Distance,
Estimated distance=(true distance) 1 " 25
elevation may extend that barrier. However, setting a large
distance as the FAC's limit contradicts the character of
close air support, which typically operates close to the
FLOT. It may well be questioned whether distances beyond
ten kilometers from the FLOT can still be considered as
falling within the purview of close air support.
Let 1/b = scaling factor, where b > 0. Then, b = the
maximum range .of FAC effectiveness, expressed in 'kilometers.




where the subscript H indicates target acquisition
55
Figure 3. FAC Effectiveness v. True Distance,
AH =FAC Effectiveness=l-( true <ytance )
1-25
, b = 10 .
methods that involve subjective distance estimation without
laser devices, and where x = true distance (km)
.
For example, setting b = 10 to indicate that beyond 10
km the FAC's effectiveness is zero produces Figure 3.
In summary, Method A involves modeling a FAC's
effectiveness as a function of the straight line distance
between his location and all points within the scaling
factor of b km. Since more than one FAC may be present on
the battlefield, the subscript Fi is used where i = 1,2,3, .
. . . This method may be denoted as:
AFi>L = l for laser designating;
1.25A Fl = 1 AFuH=l-\^fj for subjective distance
judging, where scaling factor b > 0.
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The principal advantage to using Method A is that it is
based on field experiments which closely resembled, in the
distances experimented over, the distances a FAC would
likely operate at while directing CAS.
2. Method B: Exocentric Distance Judgments
The principal disadvantage to Method A is that it does
not model errors in exocentric distance judgments, one of
the most common methods a FAC uses to provide aircraft
guidance to a target. If the FAC does not guide an aircraft
to a target by using a prominent terrain feature or smoke
mark as an offset point, he will surely use the first round
miss of the attacking
aircraft to guide subsequent strikes. In short, exocentric
distance judgment is an essential part of the FAC's function
when working without laser equipment
.
Experimentation has shown [Ref. 21] that two principal
factors influence the amount of error involved in estimating
the distance between two objects, or interobject distance:
the true interobject distance and the visual angle along the
viewer's line of sight.
Visual angle is the angle "taken at the position of the
observer, between the two lines of sight when the observer
looks first at one of the objects and then at the other"
[Ref. 21:p. 251]. Variation in visual angle can arise from
three sources: 1) alignment change with respect to the line
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of sight (alignment is defined "by the angle formed between
the line of sight of the subject and a line segment
connecting the two objects" [Ref. 21: p. 251]); 2) a change
in viewing distance between the observer and the midpoint of
the interobject distance between two objects; and, 3) a
change in true distance between the two objects. See Figure
4.
Based upon field experiments in a 20x20 meter field
with eight viewing subjects, Levin & Haber [Ref. 21]
determined that the relationship between estimated
interobject distance (eid) , true interobject distance (tid),
and visual angle (va, degrees) is an increasing linear one
with the following form [Ref. 21:p.252]:
eid = (1.108 * tid) + (0.164 * va)
.
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Figure 5. Estimated Interobject Distance (eid) v. Visual
Angle (va) and True Interobject Distance (tid)
,
eid = (1.108 * tid) + (0.164 * va) .
This relationship indicates that subjects consistently
overestimate interobject distance as both true interobject
distance and visual angle increase. This function is
graphically depicted in Figure 5.
In order to convert this linear relationship into one
indicating FAC effectiveness, it is necessary to convert the
function so that the ordinate ranges from zero to one.
Following the argument of Method A, it is also necessary to
scale the function to indicate the interobject range and
visual angle at which FAC effectiveness is zero.
This scaling factor does not bear so obvious a
relationship to distance and angle as it does with Method A
above. As before, let b = scaling factor. Then, converting
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the ordinate of the previous graph to range between zero and
one, and invoking the scaling factor, we have (using the
same notation used to denote Method A)
:
Ah = 1 -[j* (U08 **/</+ 0.164 *va)] .
It is clear that Ah equals zero when the following holds
true:
£=1.108*ta/+0.164*va.
Since this function is linear, the value of b is found
when tid and va are maximized. The maximum possible value
of va is 180 degrees, a value limited by the way visual
angle is defined. Setting va = 180, the above equation
becomes,
b= 1.108 **/</+ 29.52.
True interobject distance (tid) , on the other hand, has
no such limit (other than the natural curvature of the
earth) . There may be some argument, however, to support the
contention that a FAC will rarely operate with true
interobject distances greater than one kilometer. Setting
tid = 1, then, gives b = 30.63. Using this value for b in
the function for FAC effectiveness produces the two plot
views depicted in Figures 6 and 7. Combining this
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Figure 6. First View of FAC Effectiveness v. True
Interobject Distance (km) and Visual Angle (degrees),
AB = FAC Effectiveness=l
-f 35763* (1.108 *tid+0. 164* va)
]
expression with that for laser-designating produces:
Afir i = l for laser designating;
A Ft =\ AFitB=l-\_T* (1.108*tid+0.164*va)] for
subjective distance judging, where scaling
factor < b < 31.
The principal advantage of using Method B to
characterize FAC effectiveness is that it reflects to a
greater degree than Method A the actual procedures that FACs
generally employ when guiding an aircraft to a target
without laser equipment. FACs typically rely on
interobject, or exocentric, distance judgments more than
egocentric ones.
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Figure 7. Second View of FAC Effectiveness v. True
Interobject Distance (km) and Visual Angle (degrees),
As = FAC Effectiveness=l -[-55755-* (1.108* tid+ 0.1 64* va) ]
One disadvantage, however, is that the linear model
that Method B is based on was generated from experimental
conditions using distance judgments over short ranges [Ref.
21:p. 251], not the longer ranges a FAC will typically
operate at (500 meters or more) . This means that this model
may substantially misrepresent the error involved in judging
interobject distance.
Another disadvantage to using Method B is that it
requires more information than Method A to use. For the
sort of graphical device envisioned for depicting combat
power potential surfaces, users would have to know the
locations not only of FACs, but their target reference
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points as well. While this is not impossible, it is not
required to use Method A.
3. Forward Air Controller (FAC) Airborne
Not all FACs are ground-based. The use of airborne
FACs in spotter aircraft is increasingly prevalent, and
frequently a pilot in another attack aircraft will serve as
a FAC for follow-on missions.
The effectiveness of airborne FACs, or FAC(A)s, may be
modelled in much the same manner that Method B models
ground-based FAC effectiveness. The FAC(A)'s value comes in
using ground-based visual cues to guide an attacking
aircraft to the target. Interobject distance judging, then,
adequately characterizes the FAC (A) ' s method.
Further, since attack aircraft may also be equipped
with laser designating equipment (the F/A-18D is so
equipped), laser designation of targets by FAC(A)s is also a
possibility. Therefore, the same piecemeal function may be
used for FAC (A) that was used for ground-based FACs,
assuming Method B:
Afi £=l for laser designating;
A Fi = Af±,h=1-H* ( 1. 108 * tid+ 0.1 64 *va)] for
subjective distance judging, where scaling
factor < b < 31.
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4. Forward Air Controller (FAC) Line-of-Sight
One last consideration that must be addressed before
appending a target acquisition degradation factor to (4) is
line-of-sight . Obviously, a FAC, airborne or ground-based,
cannot provide terminal guidance to a target he cannot see.
Therefore, a binary variable will be used with discrete
range of zero and one depending on whether line-of-sight
between a FAC and point x,y exists. This variable, denoted
SFf^yr is subscripted to tie it to each battlefield FAC in
case more than one exists. Therefore, let SF




1 when line-of-sight exists
between FAC F± and x,y;
otherwise;
Vx, y, i
The only complication that arises in the use of 5/^
occurs when more than one FAC has line-of-sight to a point
x,y. To resolve the question of which FAC to use to
calculate expected kills per minute for point x,y, we
stipulate that the FAC closest to x,y (and having
line-of-sight) is used to determine the power potential
surface height at that point. Since FAC (A) s will almost
always be further from any ground point than ground-based
FACs, this implies that ground-based FACs will always be
used to calculate power potential except at those points not
directly visible to them. At those points, FAC(A)s will be
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directly visible to them. At those points, FAC(A)s will be
used to calculate power potential. This accords with common
sense and actual practice.
Appending Ap
i
and aS/t. to expression (4) gives the
following:
SFijcyAFt TPZajiertsyj ZftaRKo\ta V*,y, F, Alert, t,a, ( 5 ) .
D. VISIBILITY IN THE BATTLEFIELD AREA
Battle space visibility plays a critical role in the
complicated process of target acquisition. Environmental
conditions (e.g., airborne dust or sand, night, dusk, or
daylight), weather (e.g., rain, snow) and battlefield
conditions (e.g., smoke, vehicle exhaust), all help
determine minimum visibility distances. While modeling
moment-to-moment visibility conditions is not the aim of
this thesis, a general visibility factor for the battle
space should be included in PPcas to reflect the added
difficulties involved in acquiring targets under less than
ideal visible conditions.
It is not disputed that a diminution of visibility has
a negative effect on the target acquisition ability of
pilots. Laser guided weapons are not immune to this effect,
either: fog, smoke, and other particle-based obscurants all
serve to absorb laser energy, diminishing and scattering the
beams. How is this negative effect to be modelled?
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In field experiments supervised by the U.S. Army's
Night Vision and Electro-Optical Laboratories (NVEOL) , it
was found that the time to detection of a target made
available for detection at t = could be modelled by the
(slightly modified) exponential distribution [Ref.
26: Chapter 4]. Only one such probability model, however,
can be descriptive for a given environment; in short, the
exponential model, with a given parameter and modification,
assumes a constant visibility environment. Yet it is the
effect of a varying visibility environment that is needed
here.
For the sake of model tractability, the effect of
changes in visibility conditions will be modelled as linear
changes in the acquisition capabilities of pilots, despite
the exponential character of detection probability under a
given environment. Specifically, visibility degradation
will degrade CAS effectiveness linearly.
This definition of the visibility degradation factor
requires that the model user provide some measure of the
visibility conditions under which the combat is or will be
occurring. This is the Maximum Visibility Distance (MVD)
:
the maximum distance pilots are able to see through the
atmosphere. This value must be obtained externally to the
model, either from real visibility conditions or conditions
imposed by war gaming.
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The point at which visibility no longer has a degrading
effect on CAS effectiveness may be set to 10 km to accord
with the 10 km limit on FAC effectiveness employed above.
Clear visibility of 10 km (over 32,000 ft) satisfies the
requirements of close air support: target acquisition and
attack can be adequately performed under these environmental
conditions. Accordingly, the expression for a battlefield
visibility degradation factor is as follows:
V =
Maximum Visibility Distance (MVD) ,. _ ^ mTr, > i n ,
Yo for 1 <: MVD < 10 km,
1 for MVD > 10 km.
Including this visibility factor in PPcas gives:
VSF^AF.TPZa^iert^t^ftaRKo^a Vx,y9 F,AIert,t,a, (6)
.
The resulting value of V will be determined by the MVD,
which is itself determined by strike planners or wargamers




In summary, this thesis presents a method for
quantifying the combat power potential of U.S. Marine Corps
close air support. The resulting values are suitable for
display as a spatio-temporally dynamic combat power
potential surface. This surface, expressed in units of
kills per minute, can assist decision-makers in combat,
combat planning, and training, to visualize the battlefield
and the lethality contribution of CAS.
The combat power potential for CAS is calculated by:
VSFi^A FiTPZajaertm^fta^K^ta Vx^F^AlertJ^a, ,
where
V = visibility degradation factor, < V < 1;
Srlfxy-
1 when line-of-sight exists
between FAC F ± and x,y;
otherwise;
Vx, y, i
Af= target acquisition degradation factor for FAC Ft ,
T = threat degradation factor;
P = pilot proficiency degradation factor;
fta = fraction of enemy force of target type ta;
R = sorties per minute R = j^q , n = no. sorties
allocated a CAS mission per 24 hour period;
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(Ko\ta = kills per sortie for against target type ta
using ordnance o where ^<^a~~J^ t and J \ta is the "expected
number of sorties for a desired fractional damage," using
ordnance o, given target ta [Ref. 8:Appendix A] ;
1
for sortie aircraft a, Alert status,
point x,y, and time t;
0;
and subscripts are:
Fj = Forward Air Controller, i =. 1,2,3 . . . ;
ta = target type, e.g., tanks, infantry, armored
personnel carriers, etc.;
o = ordnance type, e.g., Mk-82, Mk-83, etc.;
o\ ta = ordnance type o given target type ta;
a = aircraft type, F/A-18D or AV-8B;
Alert = alert status, ground or air alert;
x,y = Cartesian coordinates for points in a
battlefield area;
t = time in minutes elapsed from a reference time.








dhr+xy ~ distance from base B, to point x,y, i = 1,2,3 .
Rangea = maximum flight endurance time for aircraft a,
expressed in minutes of flight, e.g., Rangefia-\%d= 103
minutes;
kidSajc - knots indicated air speed for aircraft a for
flight type k, where a = F/A-18D or AV-8B, and k = del
(ordnance delivery speed or max (maximum endurance speed),
e.g., kiaSAV-ZBjoax. =230;
Bj = aircraft base i, i— 1,2,3. . • , where B, is
a x,y pair of Cartesian coordinates;
tk = time (in minutes) required for ground alert
aircraft to get airborne after receiving a mission, tk =
l , z , . . .;
t = clock time (in minutes from t = 0) an aircraft
in ground or air alert status receives a mission.












tvEP = clock time of aircraft departure for designated
orbit point;





This chapter demonstrates, in four parts, the
calculation and display of the combat power potential
surface for close air support in a fictitious battlefield
scenario. In the first part, the scenario and assumptions
used to generate the surfaces are described. In subsequent
parts, surfaces are generated for three areas: FAC placement
on the battlefield, FAC terminal guidance method, and
aircraft basing decisions.
A. SCENARIO AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this scenario, a Marine Expeditionary Force Forward
(MEF FWD) has been assigned the mission of blocking and
destroying an enemy unit which intelligence has located
traveling north toward a pass through the mountains. This
enemy unit is a combined armor-mechanized infantry force of
brigade size with three principal target types: tanks, APCs,
and infantry. The terrain chosen for this confrontation is
an approximately 11x11 kilometer region of the California
high desert. Elevations range from 1350 feet above sea
level at the valley floor, sloping upward, gently at first,
to 1400 feet, and then rising sharply on either side to 2000
feet. See Figure 8.
The ground combat elements of the MEF FWD are located


















valley floor and on the elevated terrain on either side
(FLOT) . Fields of fire are located southward in the shallow
depression of the valley center, where the enemy force is
expected to appear
.
In preparing the graphical displays of a combat power
potential surface, certain assumptions were made. In order
to preserve the unclassified character of this thesis, the
data resident in the JMEM/AS was not consulted. Rather than
proceeding through the eight step process of Chapter III
(which requires stipulating a damage criterion, and desired
probability of damage), values for "number of sorties to
kill" a tank, APC, or infantryman, were directly conjectured
and have no firm empirical basis:
• number of sorties to kill a tank [J \ta) = 1.5;
• number of sorties to kill an APC =1.2;
• number of sorties to kill an infantryman = .75;
Other values the model requires were stipulated as
follows:
• tk = 5 minutes for ground alert aircraft to get
airborne after mission receipt;
• t' = 0, the clock time a CAS mission is received;
• toEP = 0, clock time of aircraft departure for an
orbit point;
• visibility factor = .99;
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• threat factor = .9;
• pilot proficiency = .9;
• number of sorties available for the next 24 hour
period = 20;
• fraction of tanks in enemy force = .05;
• fraction of APCs in enemy force = .05;
• fraction of infantrymen in enemy force = .9.
("Fraction of infantrymen" is measured in individual
soldiers. Therefore, the enemy force has about 18
dismounted infantry for every tank and APC.)
B. FAC PLACEMENT
One area where the combat power potential surface
display can assist tactical decision-makers is that of the
tactical emplacement of FACs. In order to situate the two
FACs (for the sake of presentational simplicity, only two
FACs were used in this scenario instead of the usual MEF FWD
complement of four) where they have the best vantage points
on the enemy avenue of approach, graphical displays of
combat power potential can be employed using different FAC
locations. Both FACs are using range and bearing estimates
from their locations (Method A) to guide attacking aircraft




The best locations for the FACs may be determined by a
simple map study (see Figure 8). This study suggests that
the most advantageous place to locate them appears to be on
the highest points overlooking the valley, the 1900 ft. peak
on the left for one FAC and the 2000 ft. peak on the right
for the second FAC. Figure 9 indicates, however, that PPcas
is rather limited with this deployment: with red indicating
the highest PPcas and purple the lowest (in effect, zero
combat power potential), each FAC has only limited PPcas
when situated on the peaks, with almost all of it on the
steep valley sides opposite to each location.
This limitation is largely due to the restricted
lines-of-sight obtainable from these peaks, as evidenced by
the predominance of purple (i.e., zero power potential) in
the surface. Were the principal cause of the low PPcas
distance from each FAC, a greater range of color (from red
to purple) would be visible as FAC effectiveness tapered off
with increasing distance.
By re-locating the FACs to the slightly elevated
shoulders of the valley (14 00 ft.), the PPcas is
considerably improved, as shown in Figure 10. Located at
these lower points, the FACs have considerably higher

















C. FAC TERMINAL GUIDANCE METHOD
Varying the method of target designation by the FACs
also produces a considerably different battlefield picture.
Contrast Figures 10 and 11: the former was generated
assuming the FACs employed subjective range and bearing
estimates, while the latter assumes the use of laser target
designation. Note that, although there is no area expansion
of the power potential surface when lasers are used, those
areas that the FACs can see have a considerably higher power
potential in Figure 11 than in Figure 10. This is indicated
by the preponderance of deep red in areas that were formerly
light red, yellow, or green. Put another way, the bulk of
power potential degradation shown in Figure 10 can be
attributed to distance judgments errors on the part of the
FACs.
D. BASING DECISIONS
By varying time t, the combat power potential surface
can also show the battlefield impact of decisions on
aircraft basing, whether to base CAS aircraft aboard ships,
ashore, or even in a neighboring friendly country (this last
alternative is not explored here)
.
Consider first the decision to base all CAS aircraft
aboard amphibious vessels and carriers located e.g., 31
miles (50 km) north of the operations area, or about 35
miles (56 km) north of the FLOT. Of principal concern to a
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MEF FWD Commander would be the timeliness and sustainability
of CAS in the battle area, particularly in light of their
shipboard basing. To address these concerns, graphical
displays can be used to reveal the combat power potential of
CAS available at various t (Figures 12, 13, and 14) . These
displays indicate that, under the assumption that all
aircraft are ship-based, CAS would be available at the FLOT
to a ground commander by t = 20 minutes (Figure 13) after
receipt of a CAS mission, and over the enemy avenue of
approach by t = 22 (Figure 14). While this time lag may be
accounted for in scheduling pre-planned missions and need
not present a serious problem for these types of missions,
it may be intolerable for on-call missions. Under these
circumstances, CAS is not timely, but it is sustainable.
One way to reduce this time lag is to put CAS aircraft
in an air alert status in orbit points in proximity to the
FLOT, thereby reducing their response time. Assume that CAS
aircraft are placed in orbit points approximately 5.5 km
behind the FLOT. Figure 15 shows that CAS is available over
the enemy avenue of approach by t = 2, but Figure 16
indicates that the reach of CAS begins to degrade by t = 80
(Figure 16), and does not extend beyond the FLOT by t = 82
(Figure 17) . CAS is now timely, but may not be sustainable.
One solution is a mix of ship- or airfield-based










































orbit points. In this arrangment, CAS is partially-
available forward of the FLOT as early as t = 1 minute
(Figure 18), is fully available at t = 2 minutes
(Figure 19), and is still fully available as late as t = 83
minutes (Figure 20)
-
This chapter demonstrates some of the capabilities of
the graphical display of combat power potential for CAS.
Many more variables in the model could be changed, revealing





In conclusion, two points can be made.
First, the model developed here is deterministic rather
than stochastic. The random occurrences that typically mark
air warfare are not explicitly included. For instance, no
attempt has been made to model unforeseen aircraft
mechanical failures that have a negative impact on
aggregated air power. The model assumes that once an ACE
commander determines how many aircraft sorties he can
dedicate to CAS for a 24 hour period, he will provide that
number. Aircraft failures (or casualties) will only be
reflected in the number of sorties available for the next 24
hour planning period.
It is important to note that this exclusion of random
changes in air power does not extend to immediate CAS
missions. This is not because the model possesses
stochastic elements; as already stated, the model is
deterministic. Rather, immediate CAS requests, though
random by definition, result in neither a diminution nor
amplification of total airpower available to support the
ground war. Such requests simply divert CAS aircraft from
one specific mission to another. This has no effect on the
combat power potential of CAS, which by definition is the
capacity to deliver lethal fire throughout the battlefield
at any time. CAS mission diversion actualizes potential at
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another battlefield point without altering capacity, i.e.,
combat power potential.
Second and last, the aim of this thesis is to assist
the MAGTF Commander and his staff in visualizing the
battlefield through time by allowing them to see how
tactical decisions impact on the ability to mass force. It
neither supplants military judgment and expertise, nor
provides a "how to win battles'' computer tutorial. The
algorithm for computing CAS combat power potential presented
in this thesis has been constructed, as much as possible,
out of the objective, physical capabilities and limitations
of CAS aircraft and aircrews. The many intangible factors
that influence, and may even decide, combat, e.g., morale,
fear, the mental attitude of opposing commanders, etc., are
beyond the scope of this algorithm, and probably beyond any
computer calculation.
Nevertheless, by allowing a MAGTF Commander to "see" at
a glance where and when on the battlefield he can bring
combat power to bear, the visualization aimed at in this
thesis can free him to consider those intangibles all the
more.
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APPENDIX. JAVA APPLICATION TO CALCULATE COMBAT POWER
POTENTIAL IN A FICTITIOUS BATTLE SCENARIO
/'
Modelling the Combat Power Potential of Marine Corps CAS
*
*This program reads in map data (terrain points and
associated elevation) from a 2 dimensional array data
structure and computes the expected kills per minute
achievable at each point by Marine Corps close air support
aircraft, the F/A-18D and AV-8B, given specified
battlefield conditions, base locations, locations of two
Forward Air Controllers (FACs), aircraft alert status,
etc. The resulting value, the power potential of CAS, is
outputted to a file.
import java.io. + ;
















int MAXFLIGHT = 101; //max flight
//time
int DAYMINUTES = 1440; // 60 min
//24 hrs
int KIASDEL = 500; //speed of
//ordnance delivery
int KIASMAX = 240; //maximum
//endurance speed
int LOITER = 5; //minimum required
//loiter time
int SCALE = 10; //max useful
//distance for FACs
double POWER = 1.25; //used to
//calculate FAC degradation
double CELL = .09; //each map cell
//is .09x.09 km
int ARRAYSIZE = 125; //2-D array
//size
int FACHEIGHT = 3; //FACs height
//above ground
int TGTHEIGHT = 5; //Target height
//above ground
int ELEVARRAY = 1000; //max possible
//size elev array
int DELTABASE = 50; //add to base
//distance




private static double visibility; // visibility
//degradation factor
double threat; //threat degradation
//factor




private static double sortiestank;



























double numsorties; //no. of CAS sorties
//available for 24 hours
//airbase x coordinate
//airbase y coordinate
//x coord of air alert
//aircraft orbit point
//y coord of orbit point
//fraction of enemy force
//made up of tanks
//fraction of enemy force
//made up of bmps
double finfantry; //fraction of enemy force



















//l if can strike point x,y;
//otherwise
//l if line of sight from FAC1
//to x,y; otherwise
//l if line of sight from FAC2
//to x,y; otherwise
//point's distance to airbase
; //point's distance to orbit
//point of aircraft
//point's distance to FAC1
//point's distance to FAC2
//expected kills per minute at
//point x,y
//elevation at point x,y
//x coordinate of grid point
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private double y; //y coordinate of grid point
private double acquirel; //FAC1 degradation factor for
//point x,y
private double acquire2; //FAC2 degradation factor for
//point x,y
//constructor method




distoBase = Double. POSITIVE_INFINITY;
distoOrbit = Double. POSITIVF_INFINITY;
distoFacl = Double. POSITIVE_INFINITY;










public double getFacldistance ( ) {return distoFacl;}
public double getFac2distance ( ) {return distoFac2;}
public double getdistoBase () {return distoBase;}
public double getdistoOrbit () {return distoOrbit;}
public int getlineOfSightl () {return lineOfSightl;}
public int getlineOfSight2 () {return line0fSight2;
}
public int getStrike( ) {return strike;}
public double getAcquirel () {return acquirel;}
public double getAcquire2 () {return acquire2;
}
//setter methods













This method, as well as the three methods that follow
it, sets the instance point's distance from an
aircraft base by calling the "range" method for the
x,y distance, and then multiplying the resulting value
by the size of the cells in the DTED map, .09
kilometers (90 meters), to obtain distance in
kilometers. The constant DELTABASE is added
to situate a base at a specific distance from the
terrain sector under consideration, i.e., off the map.
*/
public void setBasedistance (int basex, int basey)
{




This sets the instance point's distance from an
aircraft orbit point.
*/
public void setOrbitdistance (int orbitx, int orbity)
{
distoOrbit = DELTAORBIT + CELL *
(range (orbitx, orbity) );
}
/*
This sets the instance point's distance from FAC #1
*/
public void setFacldistance (int facx, int facy) {




This sets the instance point's distance from FAC #2
*/
public void setFac2distance (int facx, int facy) {
distoFac2 = CELL * (range (facx, facy) )
}














public double range (int ex, int wy)
{
double changex = ex - x;
double changey = wy - y;





This method determines whether line of sight exists
between the instance point (x,y) and the locations of
the two FACs. The if-else loop's two portions are mirror
images of each other, depending on whether the y
dimension between the x,y and the FAC is larger or the x
dimension is larger. This method owes its form to the PV




public void figureLOS (double [] [] gridArray,
int [ ] [ ] facArray )
{
double elevFAC, elevPT, yincrement, yaccumulator,
xincrement, xaccumulator, zincrement,
numLOStests, LOSline, terrain;
int counter, xcell, ycell, increment, deltax, deltay,
facx, facy,i,j;
boolean obstacle;
double elevArray[] = new double
i = 0;
j = 0;
while (i <= 1) {
counter =0;
facx = facArray [i] [j]
;
j = J + l;
facy = facArray [i] [j];
if (facx == x && facy == y) {
[ELEVARRAY];
if (i == 0) {
setLOSl(l)
;












deltax = (int)Math.abs (x-facx)
;
deltay = (int)Math.abs (y-facy)
if (deltay < deltax) { //step in x
//direction





increment = 1; //point is to right
//of FAC
}




//this for loop collects the elevations of
//all cells between the x,y and the FAC
for (xcell = facx; xcell != x; xcell = xcell
+ increment) {
ycell = (int) yaccumulator;
elevArray [counter] =
gridArray [xcell] [ycell];
yaccumulator = yaccumulator +
yincrement;
counter = counter + 1;
}
}
else { //step in
//y direction








xincrement = (x - facx) /deltay;
92
xaccumulator = facx;
for (ycell = facy; ycell != y; ycell = ycell
+ increment) {
xcell = (int) xaccumulator;
elevArray [counter] =
gridArray [xcell] [ycell];
xaccumulator = xaccumulator +
xincrement;
counter = counter + 1;
}
} //end inner if loop
} //end outer if loop
elevFAC = elevArray [0] + FACHEIGHT;
elevPT = elevation + TGTHEIGHT;
numLOStests = counter - 1; //don't check point
//cell elevation
zincrement = 0.0;
zincrement = (elevPT - elevFAC) / (counter - 1);




//this for loop compares each intervening cell
//elevation with the elevation of the LOS line
//between x,y and FAC
for (ctr = 1; ctr <= numLOStests; ctr++) {//test
//all points between
LOSline = LOSline + zincrement;
terrain = elevArray [ctr]
;
if (LOSline <= terrain) {
obstacle = true;








} //end for loop




if (obstacle == false && i == 1) {
setLOS2(l)
}
i = i + 1;
j = 0;
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this method determines whether the x,y point can be
reached by aircraft in air alert and/or ground alert,
depending on aircraft status as set by the user
**************************************************
*/
public void figureStrike (double t, double tk, double
tprime, double tdep,
boolean air, boolean ground)
{
int counter, groundstrike, airstrike;
groundstrike = 0;
airstrike = 0;
if (ground == true) {
if (2*distoBase/(KIASMAX/60) + LOITER <=
MAXFLIGHT && tprime + tk +







if (air == true) {
if (distoOrbit/(KIASDEL/60) +
distoBase/(KIASMAX/60) + LOITER <= MAXFLIGHT
- t + tdep && tprime +


















this method determines the degradation to CAS
effectiveness caused by the FAC's distance from the
point; if the FAC is using laser target
designators, strike is set to one; if he is relying on
subjective judgments of range and bearing to the
target from his positions, the amount of degradation
is calculated as shown
************************************************
*/
public void facdegrade (boolean laser) {
if (laser == true) {
setAcquirel (1)
;
setAcquire2 ( 2 )
}
else {
if (getlineOfSightl() == 1 && getlineOfSight2 (
)
== 1){
if (getFacldistance ( ) <= getFac2distance ( ) &&
getFacldistanceO < SCALE) {
setAcquirel ( 1 -
Math.pow(getFacldistance() /SCALE, POWER) ) ;
}
if (getFacldistanceO > getFac2distance ( ) &&
getFac2distance ( ) < SCALE)
{
setAcquire2 (1 -
Math. pow( getFac2distance() /SCALE, POWER) )
;
}




if (getFac2distance() > SCALE) {
setAcquire2 (0)
}
} // end if loop
if (getlineOfSightK) == 1 && getline0fSight2 ()
— 0) {
if (getFacldistanceO < SCALE) {
setAcquirel ( 1 -








if (getlineOfSightl () == && getline0fSight2 ()
— 1) {
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} // end else
} // end method
/*
***********************************************
this method calculates the final value, "expected
kills per minute", for each instance point. If both




public double calcPPCAS ( ) { //calculates expected
//kills per minute
double r, sum, tempi, temp2;
r = numsorties/DAYMINUTES;














public static void main (String argv[]) throws
IOException {
int laser, A, G, row, column, i, j;
boolean L, air, ground;
double t, tk, tprime, tdep;





int facArray[] [] = new int [2] [2] ; //this array holds
//FAC locations
System. out. print In ("begin working . . . . ");
FilelnputStream infilel = new
FilelnputStream ("inputs.txt")
;
StreamTokenizer tokensl = new
StreamTokenizer (infilel)
tokensl . nextToken ( )
;
for(i = 0; i <= 1; i++) {
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
facArrayfi] [j] = (int) tokensl. nval;




t = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken () ; // clock time
tk = tokensl. nval; tokens 1. nextToken ( ) ; // time to
//get airborne
tprime = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken () ; //clock
//time mission rec'd
tdep = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken () ; // time of
//aircraft departure
A= (int) tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken( )
;
//aircraft in air alert
G = (int) tokensl .nval; tokensl. nextToken ()
;
//aircraft in ground alert
visibility = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ( )
;
threat = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken( )
pproficiency = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ()
;
sortiestank = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ( )
;
sortiesbmp = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ( )
sortiesinfantry = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ()
;
numsorties = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ()
basex = (int) tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ()
basey = (int) tokensl .nval; tokensl. nextToken ()
orbitx = (int) tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ( )
orbity = (int) tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ( )
ftanks = tokensl. nval; tokensl. nextToken ()
fbmps = tokensl .nval; tokensl. nextToken ( )
;
finfantry = tokensl .nval; tokensl .nextToken ()
;
laser = (int ) tokensl .nval;
infilel. close ( )
;
System. out. println ("read in input file . . .");
gridArray = new double [ARRAYSIZE] [ARRAYSIZE];
FilelnputStream infile = new
FilelnputStream ( "E : /warmap . txt " )
StreamTokenizer tokens = new StreamTokenizer
(infile)
System. out .println ("begin reading in map array . .");
for (row = 0; row < ARRAYSIZE; row++) {
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for (column = 0; column < ARRAYSIZE; column++) {
tokens . nextToken ( )
;
gridArray [row] [column] = tokens. nval;
}
}
infile. close ( )
;
System. out. printIn ("done reading in map array . . ");
FileOutputStream outfile = new
FileOutputStream ( "E : /PPCAS . txt" )
;
PrintStream output = new PrintStream (outfile)
;
System. out. println ("begin calculating power potential
... / /
for (row = 0; row < ARRAYSIZE; row++) {
for (column = 0; column < ARRAYSIZE; column++) {
PowerCAS p = new PowerCAS (row, column,
gridArray [row] [column] )
p.setBasedistance (basex, basey)
;
p. setOrbitdistance (orbitx, orbity)
;









p.setFacldistance(facArray[0] [0], facArray [0] [1]);
p. setFac2distance( facArray [1] [0], facArray [1] [1]);
p . facdegrade ( L )
;














p.figureStrike (t, tk, tprime, tdep, air, ground);
if (column == ARRAYSIZE - 1) {
output .println (p.calcPPCAS ( ) )
}
else {
ou tput. print (p.calcPPCAS ( ) + " ");
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}} //end inner for loop
} //end outer for loop
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